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**Cohort and Social Status Differentials in Union Dissolution:  
Analysis Using the 2001 General Social Survey**

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Discussion Paper  
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## A. Introduction

One of the biggest changes in the family is the increase of divorce that started to happen in most Western countries between 1960 and 1970. In Canada, Provencher *et al.* (forthcoming) notes that the total divorce rate of 14% in 1969 increased to about 37% in 1982. Since then, except for slight fluctuations, the divorce rate based on years of marriage, in particular, ‘the proportion of marriages expected to end in divorce by the 30<sup>th</sup> wedding anniversary’ has remained at around the same level (Statistics Canada, 2004; 2005). But this seeming stability of divorce rates for the country as a whole may be masking differences by socio-economic status of marital dissolution. The younger ages at marriage or cohabitation and child-bearing coupled with higher union dissolution translate to greater number of lone parents among the socio-economically disadvantaged. This is referred to as polarization of family life; that is, that disparities in social and economic spheres may be intensifying the differences in the experience of *parenthood* and *union dissolution*, which in turn result in differential development outcome of children (Schulze and Tyrell, 2002; Martin, 2000; Bianchi, 2000; Lochhead, 2000, 2001).

To examine the polarization in family life, we looked at the differences by social status in the start of parenthood and found that those with low social status do tend to become parents at younger ages and have greater probability than those with higher social status of taking a more direct route to parenthood, that is, without going through other life course stages such as completion of post-secondary education or marriage (Ravanera and Rajulton, 2004a; 2004b). In this paper, we focus on separation and divorce, using retrospective information on dates at experience of various family events gathered through the 2001 General Social Survey on Family History. These data allow the analysis for cohorts born from the 1920s onward. In the next section, we review studies on marital dissolution with particular attention to those that looked at the relationship of marital dissolution with indicators of social status, such as, parental and respondent’s education. We then discuss our survey data and methods, present the results of our analysis, and conclude with implications of our findings.

## B. Union Dissolution and Social Status

In a review of studies done in the eighties in the United States, White (1990: 908) indicates that there is a “clear inverse relationship between income and other measures of socio-economic status and divorce”. It seems that this finding holds true to the 1990s; Bumpass *et al.* (1991), for example, find that both mother’s and respondent’s education decrease the probability of union dissolution. However, studies in European countries do not show such unequivocal findings. Poortman and Kalmijn (2002), for example, observe that in the Netherlands, the higher a woman’s education, the more likely the divorce whereas in Great Britain, Berrington and Diamond (1999) find that men and women with degree are less likely to divorce than those without. In Norway, Lyngstad (2004) finds that parental education is positively related to divorce whereas one’s own education has a negative impact. Blossfeld *et al.* (1995) hypothesized, and provided empirical evidence,

that the differences in the relation between educational attainment and marital dissolution may be explained by the differences in the prevailing family system. In countries with more traditional family orientation (which, in their study, is represented by Italy), education has a stronger effect as women with higher education are more willing to go against prevailing social norms and are better able to deal with the consequences of marital disruption. But, in countries with more tolerant family system (as in Sweden), the relation between level of education and marital dissolution is weak. In another study, Hoem (1997) showed that education still mattered in Sweden with divorce risks increasing by level of education in the second half of the 1970s and a trend reversal by the end of the 1980s. He thinks that permissive attitude to both marriage and divorce may have had an effect on the relation between education and marital dissolution but in addition, other factors mattered as well. For instance, greater labour force participation of women with low education may have increased their risk of divorce; and, when higher education becomes more common, those who are left with low education may “increasingly have been losers in the marriage arena as well as the education system” (p. 26).

As for Canada, Balakrishnan *et al.* (1992: 129-135) did not detect a significant relation between levels of education and marital dissolution in analysis using the 1984 Canadian Fertility Survey. However, using the data from the 1990 General Social Survey, Hall and Zhao (1995) found that the risk of divorce increased with education.

In this study, we start by examining the trend of marital dissolution over cohorts to detect the kind of change over time aptly described by Lesthaeghe (1995) and van de Kaa (1987) as the Second Demographic Transition. Like several Western countries, the first stage of the Second Demographic Transition happened in Canada between 1960 and 1970 and featured an increasing rate of divorce and the end of both the baby boom and the young age at marriage. Between 1970 and 1985, the prominent changes were the increase in cohabitation and procreation within cohabiting union. The third stage, from mid-1980s to the present, features the plateau of divorce and the increase of cohabitation among the previously married. Even though our focus in this paper is on divorce (or specifically, the end of the first union), we necessarily have to bring in cohabitation and marriage as dissolution highly depends on the type of union entered into (Burch and Madan, 1986; Berrington and Diamond, 1999; Balakrishnan *et al.*, 1992; Hall and Zhao, 1995; Wu and Balakrishnan, 1995).

We then move on to explore the relation between social status (the indicator of which is explained below) and union dissolution within cohorts to detect the differentials that Blossfeld *et al.* (1995) and Hoem (1997) pointed to in Europe. As Lesthaeghe (1995:57) notes, there is “historical cumulativeness” to the Second Demographic Transition in that the “changes have been prepared during earlier periods”. We assume that the changes in the earlier periods would have been manifested in the behaviour of the innovators in older birth cohorts. These innovators would have belonged to higher social class (or would have had higher education) and would have had the social resources to go against cultural norms and the material resources to overcome the adverse outcome of their behaviour. As the transition moves along, that is, as the changes become more

widespread and the old norms disappear, the differential by social status would vanish or get reversed as other factors exert their influence, and that this would be detected in the behaviour of the younger cohorts.

### C. Data and Methods

The 2001 General Social Survey on Family History is a country-wide survey of Canadians aged 15 and older, excluding residents of Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut and full-time residents of institutions (Statistics Canada, 2003). The survey was conducted by Statistics Canada with a representative sample of 24310 respondents and gathered information on the respondent's family such as those pertaining to parents and children, about event histories of education, work, and unions through both common-law and marriage, and on various socioeconomic characteristics. This study uses retrospective information on ages at which events such as cohabitation, marriage, separation, and divorce were experienced.

Given the timing of the different stages of the second demographic transition (discussed above), we think it reasonable to assume that the oldest birth cohorts, 1926-45 would be the "innovators" of divorce; for the 1946-65 birth cohorts (the boomers), divorce would have become acceptable but they would be the "innovators" of cohabitation; finally, for the youngest cohorts, 1966-85, both divorce and cohabitation would have become widespread, the experience of which no longer carries stigma or negative sanctions for norm violation. The analysis of trends by cohort is made by 5-year birth cohorts; however, for the analysis involving social status we make use of 10-year birth cohorts as the number of cases is small in some social status sub-groups of 5-year birth cohorts. The occurrence of separation or divorce in each cohort and in each category of social status is the main focus of the analysis.

Two parental variables, mother's education and father's occupation *when the respondent was aged 15* were used to derive the *social status* variable. Parental social status is relevant to the respondents' early life transitions, which in turn impact on subsequent life events such as, divorce. We ranked mother's education and father's occupation into low, middle, and high and then combined to obtain the social status variable<sup>1</sup>. Where mother's education is missing, the measurement of social status is based only on father's occupation. Where both mother's education and father's

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<sup>1</sup> Mother's education was ranked as low (some high school or lower), middle (high school graduate or some post-secondary) or high (post-secondary graduate or higher). And, based on the prestige scores established by Goyder, Thompson, and Dixon (2003) and applied to the Standard Occupational Classification provided in the survey, father's occupations was ranked as follows: *Low* (Sales and Services Occupations, Occupations Unique to Processing and Manufacturing, Occupations Unique to Primary Industry), *Middle* (Trades, Transport, and Equipment, Business, Finance, and Administrative Occupation, Artistic, Culture, Recreational, Sport, and Occupations in Social Sciences, Education) and *High* (Management Occupations, Natural and Applied Sciences, and Health Occupations). The two rankings were added and the final social status rank was assigned as follows: low (1,2), middle (3,4), high (5,6). A score of one is possible when information on mother's education is missing.

occupation were missing, social status was imputed from the information on the respondent's education and occupation, and as it turned out, almost all of them were assigned to either low or middle social status.

As for the methods, we constructed single-decrement life tables of union dissolution using SPSS by 5-year birth cohort from 1926-30 though some results are shown until the 1961-65 birth cohorts only, as the number of unions among the youngest cohorts were not numerous. In the discussion of the results from these life tables, we mainly present the cumulative proportion of union dissolution by marital or union duration, derived from the age at the start of a union, either by marriage or cohabitation, and the age at separation or divorce.

Fractional sampling weights are used in all the statistical procedures as Statistics Canada uses complex sampling procedures for its surveys (Statistics Canada, 2003).

#### **D. Results of Analysis: Trends over Cohorts**

As marital dissolution is largely determined by the type of union entered into, we first examined the distribution of the type of first union (Table 1). Almost everyone enters a first union – for women, the percentage of respondents who enter into a union has not changed from the oldest cohort to the 1961-65 birth cohorts with about 94% or higher entering a union. The corresponding figures for men are similar except for the younger cohorts (1956-60 and 1961-65) whose percentages might yet increase as these cohorts grow older. The percentages for the youngest cohorts of men and women (1966-85) would most likely reach the same percentage as they get older. As has been documented in earlier studies (for example, Ravanera, 1995), Table 1 show that there has been a dramatic change in the type of union entered into. Whereas only 2% of women's and 4% of men's first union is formed through cohabitation among the oldest cohorts (1926-45), more than half of the first union of the youngest cohort (1966-85) is common-law. The very high percentage of common-law union for the youngest two cohorts might change as those who have already entered into a union did so at young ages that may not be typical of the cohort. Those who wait to form a union at older ages might yet choose to go directly for marriage, though the percentage will most likely not be higher than those of the older cohorts.

Figures 1a and 1b reflect the general trend of rising rates of divorce, but not the leveling off that seems to have occurred in the late 1980's. The cumulative proportion of divorce by marital duration of both men and women has continued to increase from oldest to youngest cohort. A refined analysis is needed to bring out the relation between cohort and period changes.

The cumulative proportion of union dissolution by type of first union reveals interesting trends over cohorts, particularly in the marital dissolution of those who first cohabited and then proceeded to marry. For the 1946-50 birth cohort, marital dissolution among those who cohabited first is markedly higher than those who went directly for marriage (Figures 2a and 2b). This difference has been observed in previous Canadian

studies, notably by Burch and Madan (1986), Balakrishnan *et al.* (1987), and Hall and Zhao (1995), one main explanation being the selection effect; that is, those who go for cohabitation differs in important ways from those who marry directly, for example, in their orientation and values about families. Among the younger 1961-65 birth cohort, however, the difference in marital dissolution between those whose marriage is preceded by cohabitation and those who marry directly has become smaller, a possible indication that as common-law union becomes widespread, those who cohabit are no longer a “select” group.

Figures 2a and 2b also show that dissolution of common-law unions that do not end in marriage has not change very much from the 1946-50 to the 1961-65 birth cohorts. These unions are dissolved quickly, though in both cohorts about 20% of such unions remain intact after 15 years of union. These intact common-law unions are possibly akin to marriage except for the absence of formal marriage ceremony.

## **E. Results of Analysis: Differences by Social Status**

### ***1. Percentage Distribution of Type of First Union and Percentage of Unions Dissolved.***

The general trend in differences by social status in the distribution by type of first union and the percentages of unions ending in separation or divorce is as we expected -- in the older cohorts, those with high social status are more likely to divorce and more likely to enter into cohabiting unions but that these differences become attenuated among the younger cohorts (see Tables 2 and 3, in particular, the last column in both tables). The differences by social status in the oldest cohort (1926-45) in both cohabitation and marital dissolution are stronger for women than for men, possibly because women may have been more constrained by prevailing norms.

The differences in social status that we expected are also clearer for women. For marital dissolution (Table 3), the high status women have the highest percentage of dissolution in the oldest cohorts. For the succeeding cohorts, the boomers, the middle class has moved on to have the highest percentage of union dissolution. This trend stays until the youngest cohort (1976-85) when the differences by social status are reversed with those in the low status having the highest percentage of union dissolution. While this conforms to our expectation, the trend in the youngest cohort may not be definitive as those who have already formed a union in this cohort did so at younger ages and thus, they may not be fully representative of the entire cohort's experience.

The trend in cohabitation of women is very similar (Table 2); that is, the higher the social status, the larger the percentage cohabiting. This trend continues and gradually diminishes with younger cohorts. Would the expected reversal in direction happen? This will be answered only when the cohorts not as yet included in the analysis reach adulthood.



For men, the 1926-35 birth cohort does not show this general trend, but the estimates for them may not be robust as there are very few men with high social status in this cohort. However, the middle class men do show higher proportions who have cohabited or who have divorced than low status men in the oldest cohort. The estimates for the youngest 1976-85 cohort of men are hampered by a similar problem, that is, not many of them have as yet entered a union. In spite of these limitations however, the general trend of social status differentials and its shift in the younger cohorts is still discernible.

## ***2. Marital Dissolution of Direct Marriages.***

The life tables showing the cumulative proportion by social status for selected cohorts provide a closer look at these trends. Figures 3a and 3b show the proportion of marriage dissolution for women and men who married without having cohabited. Women with high social status in the 1926-35 birth cohort have the highest probabilities of dissolving their marriage, whereas for the 1956-65 birth cohort, it is the middle class women with the highest. For men, the estimates for high status men in the 1926-35 is probably best ignored as they are based on very small numbers but between the men in the middle and in the low status, those in the middle show higher probabilities of dissolution. In the 1956-65 birth cohort, men with high social status have the lowest probabilities of marital dissolution.

## ***3. Union Dissolution of Marriages Preceded by Cohabitation***

As for dissolution of cohabiting unions, comparison can be made only in cohorts with substantial numbers that have cohabited, thus excluding the oldest cohort. Further, for the youngest cohorts, while there may be greater numbers who have cohabited, the duration of such cohabitation are not long enough to allow robust estimates. Thus, for marriages that were preceded by cohabitation, comparison is made only for the boomers, the 1946-55 and 1956-65 birth cohorts. The estimates (Figures 4a and 4b) are based on smaller numbers than those for direct marriage and thus the lines representing cumulative proportions of unions are not as smooth. However, trends can be discerned and these seem to show a gender difference. For women, the differences by social status is similar to those who go directly for marriage, that is, lowest for those with high social status and highest for those in the middle class, though the *level* of dissolution is generally higher for those who go for cohabitation first before marriage. For men, marital dissolution is positively related to social status.

## ***4. Dissolution of Common-Law Unions***

The estimates of social status differences in the dissolution of common-law union that did not lead to marriage can be made only for cohorts that have substantial numbers of cohabitants for each social status, which (as seen in Table 2) are for the 1956-65 and 1966-75 birth cohort. Figures 5a and 5b show cumulative proportion of dissolution by

social status for the 1956-65 cohort whose union would have been exposed to the risk of dissolution for a longer duration. These unions have very high dissolution rates – for men, more than half have been dissolved by the 5<sup>th</sup> year with the dissolution occurring at a faster rate for those with high social status. For those with low status, the dissolution is similarly high early in the union but dissolution slows down by around the 7<sup>th</sup> year. The trend is similar for women - the higher the social status, the higher the rate of dissolution with the greatest difference occurring from around the 3<sup>rd</sup> to the 7<sup>th</sup> year of union.

## F. Conclusion

Altered patterns of behaviour are transmitted between generations through socialization, and as “a process of lateral diffusion between age peers, whereby innovations adopted ... are transmitted to others and accepted, modified, or rejected” (Hammel, 1990: 459). That divorce and cohabitation have undergone this process of diffusion is implied by the result of our analysis. Both these behaviours seem to have started among those with high social status who would have had the resources to defy prevailing norms and to cope with the adverse outcomes of their behaviours. With the change in behaviour norms, formally signalled by adoption of laws governing such behaviour - for example, the 1968 Divorce Act, and the granting of rights to common-law unions similar to those of marriage in the 1980s - social control diminishes and individual factors exert stronger influence<sup>2</sup>.

Without identifying what the individual-level factors might be, the results of this analysis indicate that the concern over polarization of family life by social status may be warranted. The ideal *modern* family, with distinct division of roles of men and women and bonded by love and children (Shorter, 1975; Aries, 1980), has been unravelled by divorce and cohabitation. As yet, there is no dominant family form that has replaced this ideal, rather, families described by Stacey (1990: 16-19) as *post-modern* are formed and re-formed dictated by conditions affecting individuals and families. In this environment, those with high social status seem to be in better position to make choices that may be favorable to them and to their children. For instance, common-law unions are more quickly dissolved among those with high social status; whereas the highest dissolution of marriages is among those with low social status. Those with resources – human, material, or social – are probably more able to stay in desirable relationship and to get out of unwanted relationship relatively quickly.

While there may be justification for concern over polarization of family life, this should be viewed in the context of social mobility as there has been a shift towards higher status – in Canada, the proportion of the middle class and those with high social status are higher in the younger than the older cohorts (Ravanera and Rajulton, 2004a.)

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<sup>2</sup> To pinpoint what these factors might be requires multivariate analysis and diffusion process modelling, which we plan on doing using the same set of data.

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
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**Table 1: Distribution by Type of First Union, By 5-Year Birth Cohort and Gender**


	<b>Number of First Union</b>	<b>As % of All Respond- ents</b>	<b>Marriage Only</b>	<b>Common-Law then Marriage</b>	<b>Common- Law Only</b>	<b>Total Common- Law</b>
<b>Females</b>						
1926-30	530	94.1	99.1	0.6	0.4	0.9
1931-35	571	96.0	98.2	1.2	0.5	1.8
1936-40	662	96.2	98.0	0.8	1.2	2.0
1941-45	845	95.9	96.0	2.0	2.0	4.0
1926-45	2608	95.6	97.6	1.2	1.2	2.4
1946-50	1019	95.4	90.1	4.9	5.0	9.9
1951-55	1217	95.8	77.8	14.1	8.1	22.2
1956-60	1368	95.9	69.2	16.6	14.3	30.8
1961-65	1371	94.3	59.2	20.5	20.4	40.8
1946-65	4975	95.3	72.8	14.7	12.5	27.2
1966-70	1081	89.7	54.0	20.8	27.8	48.7
1971-75	900	78.1	41.9	19.4	38.7	58.1
1976-80	511	46.6	21.9	9.4	68.7	78.1
1981-85	116	10.1	6.9	1.7	91.4	93.1
1966-85	2608	56.7	40.3	17.3	42.4	59.7
<b>Males</b>						
1926-30	360	95.5	98.1	0.3	1.7	1.9
1931-35	427	94.3	97.7	1.2	1.2	2.3
1936-40	509	96.6	96.5	1.2	2.4	3.5
1941-45	653	96.2	92.2	3.4	4.4	7.8
1926-45	1949	95.7	95.6	1.7	2.7	4.4
1946-50	844	95.5	88.0	5.3	6.6	12.0
1951-55	915	94.0	72.5	12.8	14.8	27.5
1956-60	1026	92.2	69.0	14.0	17.0	31.0
1961-65	1082	88.9	58.1	18.3	23.6	41.9
1946-65	3867	92.4	70.9	13.0	16.0	29.1
1966-70	829	82.4	50.5	17.9	31.6	49.5
1971-75	608	65.4	40.6	16.9	42.4	59.4
1976-80	247	27.0	16.6	8.1	75.3	83.4
1981-85	54	5.9	11.1	7.4	81.5	88.9
1966-85	1738	46.1	41.0	15.8	43.2	59.0

Source: 2001 General Social Survey


**Figure 1a: Cumulative Proportion of Marriage Dissolution by Separation or Divorce by Marriage Duration and by Cohort, Females**




**Figure 1b: Cumulative Proportion of Marriage Dissolution by Separation or Divorce by Marriage Duration and by 5-Year Birth Cohort, Males**



**Figure 2a: Cumulative Proportion of Union Dissolution by Duration of Union and Type of Union, 1946-50 and 1961-65 Birth Cohort, Females**



**Figure 2b: Cumulative Proportion of Union Dissolution by Duration of Union and Type of Union, 1946-50 and 1961-65 Birth Cohorts, Males**





**Table 2: Distribution by Type of First Union, By Social Status,  
By 10-Year Birth Cohort and Gender, 2001**

	Low CL					Middle CL					High CL					High/Low Ratio of Total CL
	N of First Union	Marr. Only	then Marr.	CL Only	Total CL	N of First Union	Marr. Only	then Marr.	CL Only	Total CL	N of First Union	Marr. Only	then Marr.	CL Only	Total CL	
<b>Females</b>																
1926-35	654	98.6	1.1	0.3	1.4	400	98.8	0.5	0.8	1.3	47	97.9	2.1		2.1	1.5
1936-45	724	97.4	1.2	1.4	2.6	695	96.5	1.7	1.7	3.5	88	95.5	2.3	2.3	4.5	1.7
1926-45	1378	98.0	1.2	0.9	2.0	1095	97.4	1.3	1.4	2.6	134	96.3	2.2	1.5	3.7	1.8
1946-55	683	86.4	8.5	5.1	13.6	1351	83.0	10.0	7.0	17.0	200	76.5	13.5	10.0	23.5	1.7
1956-65	656	65.7	18.1	16.2	34.3	1734	64.0	18.9	17.1	36.0	348	62.4	17.5	20.1	37.6	1.1
1946-65	1339	76.2	13.3	10.5	23.8	3087	72.3	15.0	12.7	27.7	549	67.4	16.2	16.4	32.6	1.4
1966-75	367	53.1	16.6	30.2	46.9	1234	44.7	21.2	34.2	55.3	383	48.8	20.6	30.5	51.2	1.1
1976-85	81	22.2	6.2	71.6	77.8	441	18.8	8.2	73.0	81.2	105	18.1	8.6	73.3	81.9	1.1
1966-85	448	47.5	14.7	37.7	52.5	1674	37.9	17.7	44.4	62.1	487	42.3	17.9	39.8	57.7	1.1
<b>Males</b>																
1926-35	502	98.6	0.4	1.0	1.4	251	96.8	1.2	2.0	3.2	32	100.0		0.0	0.0	0.0
1936-45	538	93.5	3.3	3.2	6.5	559	94.6	1.3	4.1	5.4	66	92.4	6.1	1.5	7.6	1.2
1926-45	1040	96.0	1.9	2.1	4.0	812	95.1	1.4	3.6	4.9	98	94.9	4.1	1.0	5.1	1.3
1946-55	600	82.5	8.5	9.0	17.5	1000	78.6	9.3	12.1	21.4	161	77.6	11.8	10.6	22.4	1.3
1956-65	547	59.6	18.6	21.8	40.4	1257	64.4	15.5	20.1	35.6	306	66.3	14.7	19.0	33.7	0.8
1946-65	1146	71.6	13.4	15.1	28.4	2256	70.7	12.8	16.5	29.3	466	70.4	13.5	16.1	29.6	1.0
1966-75	260	47.7	15.0	37.3	52.3	906	47.7	17.0	35.3	52.3	271	40.6	21.0	38.4	59.4	1.1
1976-85	41	22.0	7.3	70.7	78.0	203	13.8	8.9	77.3	86.2	57	17.5	5.3	77.2	82.5	1.1
1966-85	300	44.3	14.0	41.7	55.7	1110	41.4	15.6	43.0	58.6	328	36.6	18.3	45.1	63.4	1.1


Source: 2001 General Social Survey

**Table 3: Percentage of First Union Ending in Divorce or Separation  
By Social Status, 10-Year Birth Cohort, and Gender, 2001**


	Low		Middle		High		High/ Low Ratio
	N of First Union	Separation/ Divorce	N of First Union	Separation/ Divorce	N of First Union	Separation/ Divorce	
<b>Females</b>							
1926-35	653	13.6	400	16.0	48	25.0	1.8
1936-45	723	22.3	692	29.0	88	43.2	1.9
1926-45	1377	18.2	1091	24.3	136	36.8	2.0
1946-55	680	31.6	1347	34.5	200	35.5	1.1
1956-65	653	32.8	1730	38.2	348	31.9	1.0
1946-65	1333	32.2	3078	36.5	548	33.2	1.0
1966-75	366	25.4	1232	33.4	381	28.3	1.1
1976-85	81	37.0	441	36.1	105	25.7	0.7
1966-85	447	27.5	1673	34.1	486	27.8	1.0
<b>Males</b>							
1926-35	502	17.5	252	21.8	32	15.6	0.9
1936-45	537	22.5	558	27.8	66	34.8	1.5
1926-45	1039	20.1	811	25.9	98	28.6	1.4
1946-55	596	32.2	996	35.3	161	29.2	0.9
1956-65	544	36.4	1256	32.5	305	31.8	0.9
1946-65	1140	34.3	2253	33.7	466	30.9	0.9
1966-75	259	30.5	905	26.3	272	30.1	1.0
1976-85	38	31.6	203	36.9	57	49.1	1.6
1966-85	297	30.6	1108	28.2	328	33.2	1.1

Source: 2001 General Social Survey


**Figure 3a: Cumulative Proportion of Marriage Dissolution by Duration,  
by Social Status, 1926-35 and 1956-65 Birth Cohorts,  
Women Who Married Directly**




**Figure 3b: Cumulative Proportion of Marriage Dissolution by Duration,  
by Social Status, 1926-35 and 1956-65 Birth Cohorts,  
Men Who Married Directly**




**Figure 4a: Cumulative Proportion of Marriage Dissolution by Union Duration by Social Status, 1946-55 and 1956-65 Birth Cohorts, Women Who Cohabited Before Marriage**



**Figure 4b: Cumulative Proportion of Marriage Dissolution by Union Duration by Social Status, 1946-55 and 1956-65 Birth Cohorts, Men Who Cohabited before Marriage**



**Figure 5a: Cumulative Proportion of Union Dissolution by Duration,  
by Social Status, 1956-65 Birth Cohorts  
Women Whose Common-Law Union Did Not Lead to Marriage**



**Figure 5b: Cumulative Proportion of Union Dissolution by Duration,  
by Social Status, 1956-65 Birth Cohorts  
Men Whose Common-Law Union Did Not Lead to Marriage**

